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23		to 25, inclusive	e, <u>Hearing</u> : Date:	June 29, 2020
24 25			Time: Place:	9:00 a.m. Courtroom 850 Roybal Federal Building and
26				U.S. Courthouse 255 E. Temple Street Los Angeles, CA 90012
27 28			Judge:	R. Gary Klausner
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP	Defendant Travelers Casualty Insu	rance Company of		

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Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP	Defendant Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of V America's Motion to Dismiss		

Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of America ("Travelers"), erroneously sued as The Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut, hereby submits this memorandum of points and authorities in support of its Motion to Dismiss.¹

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Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP I.

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INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic has affected the public and most businesses throughout the country in unprecedented ways. But these challenging and unfortunate circumstances do not create insurance coverage for losses that fall outside the terms of a policyholder's insurance contract.

Plaintiff Geragos & Geragos Fine Arts Building, LLC ("G&G Fine Arts" or 9 "Plaintiff") asks this Court to declare that G&G Fine Arts is entitled to insurance 10 coverage for claimed business income losses allegedly caused by orders that Mayor 11 Garcetti issued to protect residential tenants during the Coronavirus pandemic (the 12 13 "Orders") and a related amendment to the Los Angeles Municipal Code ("Code Amendment"). But G&G Fine Arts ignores the material terms of its Travelers 14 insurance policy—foremost among them an explicit exclusion of *any* type of coverage, 15 including Civil Authority coverage, for any "loss or damage resulting from any virus, 16 bacterium or other microorganism that induces or is capable of inducing physical 17 distress, illness or disease." 18

In addition to the case-dispositive virus exclusion, for additional reasons G&G Fine Arts has not and cannot plead the facts necessary to establish that it is entitled to Civil Authority coverage, Business Income and Extra Expense coverage, or any of the derivative declarations that it seeks. The Complaint fails, as a matter of law, for at least two other reasons.

¹ See also contemporaneously filed motions to dismiss in Geragos & Geragos, APC v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 20-cv-4414, D.E. 1 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2020); 10E, LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 20-cv-4418, D.E. 1 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2020); Mark's Engine Co. No 28 Rest., LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 20-cv-04423, D.E. 1 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2020).

First, G&G Fine Arts fails to allege that the Orders "prohibited access" to its premises, a basic prerequisite for Civil Authority coverage. Courts nationwide have repeatedly held that to "prohibit access" requires that government authorities completely prevent access to the premises. Here, G&G Fine Arts alleges that tenants *currently accessing and occupying its premises* are not paying rent.

Second, G&G Fine Arts fails to allege facts demonstrating that it suffered a "direct physical loss of or damage to [the insured] property," which Business Income coverage requires.

And, again, even if G&G Fine Arts could have pleaded these factual requirements for coverage, its insurance claim—which results from the Coronavirus would still be *expressly excluded* by the virus exclusion.² The Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice because, as a matter of law, G&G Fine Arts cannot plead an entitlement to coverage under its contract with Travelers.

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND ALLEGED FACTS

A. This Lawsuit

G&G Fine Arts commenced this action on April 21, 2020, in Los Angeles Superior Court, against The Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut and Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti.³ Plaintiff alleges that a Travelers insurance policy bearing policy number 680-4H55186A (the "Policy")⁴ insures losses of "rental

² Because G&G Fine Arts cannot plead facts to establish coverage, its claim for bad faith premised on the wrongful denial of coverage likewise fails as a matter of law. Separately, the claim for violation of Insurance Code § 790.03 fails because the statute does not convey a private right of action.

 ³ Mayor Garcetti is neither a party to the insurance contract at issue nor does he have any rights or obligations under that contract. As explained in the Notice of Removal, Mayor Garcetti was fraudulently joined in this lawsuit and the Court should disregard his citizenship and assert its subject matter jurisdiction over this action.
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⁴ The Policy identifies "Mark & Brian's Fine Arts Building" as the insured, but Plaintiff alleges that it has changed its name to "Geragos & Geragos Fine Arts Building, LLC" since the issuance of the Policy. Compl. ¶ 1, n.1.

income/business income" at G&G's Fine Arts' property "caused by" the Orders
resulting from the Coronavirus. Compl. ¶¶ 9-11, 16-18. The Policy, which is
incorporated by reference into the Complaint, was issued by Travelers Casualty
Insurance Company of America, not the erroneously sued The Travelers Indemnity
Company of Connecticut. *See* Kupec Decl., Ex. 1 & RJN.⁵

According to the Complaint, on March 15, March 23, and March 31, 2020, Mayor Garcetti issued Orders that led to a Los Angeles Municipal Code amendment affording "tenant protections during the Coronavirus pandemic." Compl. ¶ 15. These protections "provided residential tenants with numerous relief measures," including:

(1) the ability to withhold rent on account of Coronavirus-related issues (i.e., un/underemployment, illness, quarantine, etc.);

(2) a moratorium on tenant evictions;

(3) a deferral for residential tenants to pay rent over a 12-month period . . . ; and

(4) the inability for any landlord to charge interest or late fees on the deferred rent.

16 *Id*.

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Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP G&G Fine Arts owns and manages four single-family residential cottages in Pasadena (the "Cottages"). Compl. ¶¶ 1, 6-7. G&G Fine Arts alleges that, as a result of the Orders, tenants at the Cottages have made "rent deferral requests" and have not paid rent. *Id.* ¶ 16. Thus, G&G Fine Arts alleges that it has incurred "loss of rental income" as a result of the Orders. *Id.* ¶ 18.

G&G Fine Arts appears to seek coverage for these purported rental income losses under the Policy's Civil Authority or Business Income coverages. Compl. ¶¶ 9-

⁵ The Court may properly consider the insurance policy referenced in the Complaint, even though it was not physically attached to the Complaint. *Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.*, 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (in ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court "must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as . . . documents incorporated into the complaint by reference"); *Knievel v. ESPN*, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005); *see also, e.g., Camp Richardson Resort, Inc. v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co.*, 150 F. Supp. 3d 1186, 1189 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (insurance policy).

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1 11.⁶ The Complaint frames three purported insurance coverage issues for which 2 Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment: (1) that the Orders "constitute[] an interference 3 with, loss and damage to the Insured Premises"; (2) that the Orders "trigger coverage 4 because the Policy expressly provides coverage for loss of rent and losses incurred by 5 Civil Authority Order"; and (3) that "the Policy provides coverage to Plaintiff for any 6 current and future Civil Authority Order and any accompanying loss of rental income 7 on account of such Order." See id., Prayer for Relief. The Complaint also asserts causes of action for bad faith breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and violation of Insurance Code § 790.03. Compl. ¶ 24-42.

B.

Contract Language At Issue

1. The Relevant Coverage Provisions

Plaintiff purchased an Apartment PAC Policy from Travelers, a policy that insures Plaintiff's property from covered causes of loss, such as a fire or windstorm. Consider a fire that requires a suspension of business operations. The Policy would cover lost business income or increased expenses resulting from the suspension of operations caused by the fire *and* occurring while the repairs are being made—during the "period of restoration." Plaintiff's Business Income coverage provides, in relevant part:

> We will pay for the actual loss of Business Income you sustain due to the necessary "suspension" of your "operations" during the "period of restoration". The "suspension" must be caused by direct physical loss of or damage to property at the described premises. The loss or damage must be caused by or result from a Covered Cause of Loss. . . .

⁶ Plaintiff's allegations are sometimes unclear because the Complaint purports to quote phrases that do not appear in the Policy. *See, e.g.,* Compl. ¶¶ 10-11 ("Rental Income Coverage" and "Property Optional Coverages" do not appear in the Policy).

Kupec Decl., Ex. 1 at 20-21. "Covered Causes of Loss" are "RISKS OF DIRECT PHYSICAL LOSS unless the loss is . . . [e]xcluded[.]" *Id.* at 21-22.

In the provision entitled "Civil Authority," which is the focal point of the Complaint, coverage for Business Income and Extra Expense resulting from a "Covered Cause of Loss" is extended to:

the actual loss of Business Income you sustain and reasonable and necessary Extra Expense you incur caused by <u>action of civil authority</u> <u>that prohibits access to the described premises</u>. The civil authority action must be due to direct physical loss of or damage to property at locations, other than described premises, that are within 100 miles of the described premises, <u>caused by or resulting from a Covered Cause</u> of Loss.

Id. at 33 (underscores added). As highlighted, two key requirements for this coverage to apply are: (i) a civil authority action must "prohibit" access to the insured's premises, and (ii) the action must be due to physical property loss or damage "caused by or resulting from a Covered Cause of Loss" (i.e., a cause that is not excluded from coverage).

The Policy does not provide separate Rental Income Coverage, but "Business Income" available pursuant to the Business Income or Civil Authority coverages is defined to include "Rental Value." Kupec Decl., Ex. 1 at 20. "Rental Value' means Business Income that consists of . . . Net Income . . . that would have been earned or incurred as rental income from tenant occupancy of the premises . . . ; and [c]ontinuing normal operation expenses incurred in connection with that premises[.]" *Id.* at 56.

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2. The Virus Exclusion

The Policy contains an endorsement entitled "EXCLUSION OF LOSS DUE TO VIRUS OR BACTERIA," which "applies to all coverage under all forms and endorsements that comprise" the Commercial Property Coverage Part of the Policy "including but not limited to forms or endorsements that cover . . . business income,

extra expense, rental value or action of civil authority." Kupec Decl., Ex. 1 at 117. The exclusion concisely states in plain terms that:

We will not pay for loss or damage caused by or resulting from any virus, bacterium or other microorganism that induces or is capable of inducing physical distress, illness or disease.

Id. (underscores added).

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III. LEGAL STANDARD

8 A complaint should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 12(b)(6) when "there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts 10 alleged to support a cognizable legal theory." Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 11 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 12 570 (2007) (complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face"). 13 Although "a court must take all allegations of material fact as true and construe them 14 in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party," Turner v. City & Cty. of San 15 Francisco, 788 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2015), dismissal is warranted when "the 16 complaint [can]not be saved by any amendment," Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 17 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). If a complaint fails to state a plausible 18 claim, a district court should grant leave to amend "unless it determines that the 19 pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith, 20 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citation omitted).

Under California law,⁷ the terms of an insurance policy must be given their "ordinary and popular sense," and "[i]f the policy language 'is clear and explicit, it

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⁷ California law applies here because the parties are before the Court in diversity and thus the forum state's choice-of-law principles apply. *Welles v. Turner Entm't Co.*, 503 F.3d 728, 738 (9th Cir. 2007); *Yahoo! Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA*, 255 F. Supp. 3d 970, 973 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 2017). Under California law, a "contract is to be interpreted according to the law and usage of the place where it is to be performed; or . . . where it is made." Cal. Civ. Code § 1646. Because the Policy here concerns rights and responsibilities with respect to property in California law governs. *See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. City of Richmond*, 763 F.2d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 1985).

1 governs." Palmer v. Truck Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 4th 1109, 1115-17 (Cal. 1999); Cal. 2 Civ. Code § 1638 ("The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the 3 language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity."). Indeed, "[a]n 4 insurance policy is but a contract, and, like all other contracts it must be construed 5 from the language used; when the terms are plain and unambiguous, it is the duty of 6 courts to enforce the agreement." Roug v. Ohio Sec. Ins. Co., 182 Cal. App. 3d 1030, 7 1035 (Ct. App. 1986) (citation omitted). Moreover, courts may not "rewrite a policy to 8 bind the insurer to a risk that it did not contemplate and for which it has not been 9 paid." Safeco Ins. Co. v. Gilstrap, 141 Cal. App. 3d 524, 533 (Ct. App. 1983); see also 10 Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 4th 945, 968 11 (2001) ("[W]e do not rewrite any provision of any contract, including the [insurance 12 policy at issue], for any purpose."). If a complaint "place[s] a clearly erroneous 13 construction upon the provisions of the contract," that construction should be rejected and the complaint dismissed. Marzec v. California Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 236 Cal. 14 15 App. 4th 889. 909 (Ct. App. 2015).

IV. ARGUMENT

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17 The facts pleaded in the Complaint demonstrate as a matter of law that G&G 18 Fine Arts cannot prove an entitlement to coverage under the Policy. Indeed, the 19 Complaint seeks coverage for losses that G&G Fine Arts alleges were caused by orders 20 issued to combat the spread and effects of a virus—yet, as previously described, the 21 Policy contains an explicit exclusion of *any* type of property coverage, including Civil 22 Authority coverage, for any "loss or damage resulting from any virus, bacterium or 23 other microorganism that induces or is capable of inducing physical distress, illness or 24 disease." For this reason alone, the Complaint's causes of action for declaratory relief 25 regarding coverage and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 26 should be dismissed with prejudice. The cause of action for violation of Insurance 27 Code § 790.03 should be dismissed with prejudice because the statute does not contain 28 a private right of action.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

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A. G&G Fine Arts Is Not Entitled to Civil Authority Coverage As a Matter of Law

Civil Authority coverage insures certain business losses and expenses "caused by action of civil authority" that are "due to direct physical loss of or damage to property . . . *caused by or resulting from a Covered Cause of Loss*." Kupec Decl., Ex. 1 at 33 (emphasis added). Here, the Policy explicitly excludes losses "caused by or resulting from any virus" from its Covered Causes of Loss. Moreover, the "action of civil authority" must "*prohibit[] access* to the described premises" for there to be any potential of coverage. *Id.* (emphasis added). G&G Fine Arts does not allege that access to the Cottages was prohibited; instead, G&G Fine Arts alleges that existing tenants are not paying rent. Compl. ¶ 16. Because G&G's Fine Arts' allegations fail to satisfy either requirement, dismissal is warranted as to G&G Fine Arts' requests regarding this coverage.

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1. Civil Authority Coverage Does Not Apply to Losses Caused By or Resulting From a Virus

Pursuant to the Policy's express terms, an "action of civil authority" can *only* give rise to coverage if, among other things, the action is taken "due to direct physical loss of or damage to property . . . *caused by or resulting from a Covered Cause of Loss*." Kupec Decl., Ex. 1 at 33 (emphasis added). And as a matter of logic as well as explicit policy language, an *excluded* risk of loss is *not* a Covered Cause of Loss.

The Complaint alleges that the civil authority actions—the Orders and Code Amendment—were issued because of *the Coronavirus*. Specifically, G&G Fine Arts alleges that Mayor Garcetti issued the Orders to "afford[] unprecedented and unique tenant protections during the Coronavirus pandemic[.]" Compl. ¶ 15. The Orders and Code Amendment "provided residential tenants with numerous relief measures" for "Coronavirus-related issues (i.e., un/underemployment, illness, quarantine, etc.)[.]" *Id.*

G&G Fine Arts' alleged losses, therefore, likewise are caused by or result from the Coronavirus, a risk of loss that falls squarely within the Policy's broad exclusion of

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Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP "loss or damage *caused by or resulting from any virus*, bacterium or other microorganism that induces or is capable of inducing physical distress, illness or disease." Kupec Decl., Ex. 1 at 117 (emphasis added). And this exclusion expressly applies to civil authority coverage and any "rental value" sought. *Id*. ("The exclusion applies to . . . forms or endorsements that cover business income, extra expense, *rental value or action of civil authority.*" *Id*. (emphasis added)).

California law instructs that when the language of a policy "is clear and explicit," as it is here, the language governs. *Palmer*, 21 Cal. 4th at 1115; Cal. Civ. Code § 1638. California courts evaluating policy exclusions foreclosing coverage for losses "caused by or resulting from" specified non-covered risks have found the provisions unambiguous and applied their plain meaning. *See, e.g., Atlas Assurance Co. v. McCombs Corp.*, 146 Cal. App. 3d 135, 149 (Ct. App. 1983); *see also Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Superior Court*, 65 Cal. App. 4th 1205, 1212-13 (Ct. App. 1997) (a court "will not strain to create an ambiguity where none exists or indulge in tortured constructions to divine some theoretical ambiguity in order to find coverage where none was contemplated.".⁸

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¹⁹ ⁸ While few courts have had occasion to construe a virus or microorganism exclusion, courts have enforced them in accordance with their clear and 20 unambiguous language. See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Creagh, Civ. A. No. 12-571, 2013 WL 3213345 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2013) (holding 21 that exclusion for "any loss . . . arising out of or relating to . . . [a] microorganism 22 of any type" precluded coverage for damage to bathroom caused by bacteria from dead body), aff'd, 563 Fed. App'x 209 (3d Cir. 2014); Doe v. State Farm Fire & 23 Cas. Co., No. 2015-0136, 2015 WL 11083311, at *2 (N.H. Sept. 21, 2015) ("We conclude that a reasonable person in the position of the insured, based upon more 24 than a casual reading of the policy as a whole, would understand the policy to exclude all diseases and viruses that can be transmitted from one person to 25 another."); Lambi v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 498 F. App'x 655, 656 (8th Cir. 26 2013) ("the policy excluded bodily injury arising out of the actual or alleged transmission of a communicable disease, and infecting another with the HIV virus 27 clearly falls within the plain and ordinary meaning of the transmission of a communicable disease."); Clarke v. State Farm Fla. Ins., 123 So. 3d 583, 584 (Fla. 28 Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (similar result, finding exclusion unambiguous).

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There is no question that the plain language of the virus exclusion controls here. The Complaint refers to the "Coronavirus pandemic" and acknowledges that "Coronavirus-related issues" include "illness." Compl. ¶ 15. Thus, as alleged by Plaintiff, the Coronavirus is a virus "capable of inducing physical distress, *illness* or disease," which falls squarely within the scope of the virus exclusion. Kupec Decl., Ex. 1 at 117 (emphasis added). The Coronavirus is not a Covered Cause of Loss and therefore cannot give rise to Civil Authority coverage.

Nonetheless, G&G Fine Arts requests declarations establishing civil authority coverage for losses caused by or resulting from current and future Coronavirus-related orders. Compl., Prayer for Relief. To grant G&G Fine Arts' request would "strain[] reason" and require "precisely the opposite" of the plain meaning of the virus exclusion, which unambiguously precludes coverage for any loss "caused by or resulting from" a virus. *See Atlas Assurance*, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 149. Such a result would effectively "rewrite" the Policy and improperly bind Travelers "to a risk that it did not contemplate and for which it has not been paid." *Id.*; *Marzec*, 236 Cal. App. 4th at 909-10 ("The fundamental goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time they entered into the contract.").

Because G&G Fine Arts' construction of the Policy requires that the virus exclusion be ignored, it is "clearly erroneous" and unreasonable, and thus dismissal is warranted on this basis. *Marzec*, 236 Cal. App. 4th at 909 (when the insured "place[s] a clearly erroneous construction upon the provisions of the contract," that construction cannot be accepted and the complaint should be dismissed).

2. Civil Authority Coverage Does Not Apply Because the Complaint Admits the Orders Did Not "Prohibit Access" to G&G Fine Arts' Premises

G&G Fine Arts' allegations also fail to establish Civil Authority coverage for the independent reason that the Complaint does not allege that the Orders or Code Amendment "prohibit access" to the Cottages. Plaintiff's allegations nowhere state

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that Plaintiff, its tenants, or anyone else is prohibited from accessing the Cottages, and 2 the Complaint actually suggests that tenants continue to access and occupy the 3 Cottages without paying rent. Compl. ¶ 16.9 In other words, Plaintiff acknowledges 4 on the face of the Complaint that the Orders did not close or prohibit access to the 5 G&G Fine Arts' premises. Instead, G&G Fine Arts claims entitlement to Civil 6 Authority coverage because it "has been forced to deal with rent deferral requests and 7 unpaid rent," i.e., its rental business has suffered, as a result of the Orders. Id. These 8 allegations do not satisfy the requirements for coverage under the plain language of the 9 Policy.

10 Courts interpreting civil authority provisions uniformly require the phrase 11 "prohibit access" to mean to "formally forbid" or "prevent" any access to the premises. 12 See, e.g., Southern Hospitality, Inc. v. Zurich American Ins., 393 F.3d 1137, 1140 13 (10th Cir. 2004). Restrictions that negatively impact an insured's business, but do not 14 prevent access to the business premises, are not sufficient. For example, in *Syufy* 15 Enterprises v. The Home Insurance. Co. of Indiana, the district court addressed civil 16 authority coverage for businesses affected by "dawn-to-dusk" curfews imposed by 17 cities during the Rodney King riots. 1995 WL 129229 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 1995). A 18 movie theater operator cancelled showings during the curfew period, presumably 19 because customers could not attend. *Id.* at *1. Although the orders caused the 20 insured's business to suffer, coverage was not implicated because the orders did not 21 "deny access to a Syufy theater" or "prohibit[] any individual from entering a theater." 22 Id. at *2. That the insured "opted to close its theaters" and suffered lost ticket sales as 23 a result of the curfews did not satisfy the policy language. Id.

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Civil authority coverage cases in California and elsewhere after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks reinforced this distinction between orders that "prohibit

9 Plaintiff alleges that one unit "has gone unoccupied" during the pandemic, suggesting either difficulty leasing the unit or that a tenant left, but Plaintiff does not allege that access to the presently unoccupied unit is "prohibited." Compl. ¶ 16.

1 access" to an insured premises and those that, as Plaintiff describes, "interfere[]" with 2 an insured's business. Compl. ¶ 21. In Backroads Corp. v. Great Northern Ins., 2005 3 WL 1866397 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2005), after the FAA grounded domestic air traffic in 4 the days following September 11, the court rejected a vacation tour operator's claim 5 for civil authority coverage for trip reimbursements to customers. Although the orders 6 prevented customers from utilizing their vacation packages and caused the insured's 7 business to suffer, there was no coverage because "the FAA's order did not prohibit 8 access to [the insured]'s premises[.]" Id. at *6. Courts across the country similarly 9 rejected attempts by hotels, airport parking garages, and even airport gift shops to 10 claim coverage for losses incurred as a result of the FAA orders because they did not 11 "prohibit access" to the various businesses. See Southern Hospitality, 393 F.3d at 12 1140 ("The FAA order prohibited access to airplane flights; it did not prohibit access 13 to hotel operations."); 730 Bienville Partners, Ltd. v. Assurance Co. of Am., 67 F. 14 App'x 248 (5th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) ("The generally prevailing meaning of 15 'prohibit' is . . . 'to forbid by authority or command,'" and "[i]t is undisputed that the 16 FAA did not forbid any person to access the [insured's] hotels" after the September 17 11th attacks.); Philadelphia Parking Auth. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 385 F. Supp. 2d 280, 289 18 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (While the order "may have temporarily obviated the need for 19 Plaintiff's parking services, it did not prohibit access to Plaintiff's garages and 20 therefore cannot be used to invoke coverage[.]"); Paradies Shops, Inc. v. Hartford Fire 21 Ins. Co., No. 1:03-CV-3154-JEC, 2004 WL 5704715, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 15, 2004) 22 ("The Court sees no reasonable means of construing [the] order to ground all aircraft 23 as an order specifically forbidding access to plaintiff's premises" in airport terminal 24 stores.). Likewise, while post-September 11th orders closing lower Manhattan 25 businesses in the days following the attacks "prohibited access" to businesses, 26 subsequent "vehicular traffic prohibitions" were insufficient to trigger coverage even 27 though they "restrain[ed] . . . normal operating procedures" for businesses. *Abner*, Herrman & Brock, Inc. v. Great N. Ins. Co., 308 F. Supp. 2d 331, 335-36 (S.D.N.Y. 28

Mar. 12, 2004); see also 54th St. Ltd. Partners, L.P. v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 763 N.Y.S.2d 243, 244 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).

Thus, as a matter of law, Plaintiff is not entitled to a declaration establishing Civil Authority coverage under the Policy because the Complaint does not allege (1) physical loss or damage to property "caused by or resulting from a Covered Cause of Loss" in light of the virus exclusion; or (2) that the Orders "prohibited access" to G&G Fine Arts' premises. Amendment cannot cure these defects because the lawsuit is premised on the terms of the Orders and Code Amendment, neither of which can be altered by amendment.

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B. Business Income Coverage Similarly Does Not Apply as a Matter of Law

The focal point of the Complaint is Civil Authority coverage. Yet to the extent that G&G Fine Arts' claims for "Rental Income Coverage" are intended to sweep in business interruption coverage beyond Civil Authority coverage, this claim also fails as a matter of law.

The Policy provides coverage for "actual loss of Business Income . . . due to the necessary 'suspension' of [G&G Fine Arts'] 'operations'" only if (1) the suspension is "caused by direct physical loss of or damage to property at the described premises," and (2) the loss or damage is "caused by or result[s] from a Covered Cause of Loss." Kupec Decl., Ex. 1 at 20-21. The Complaint contains no allegation of "physical loss of or damage to property" *anywhere*, let alone at the Cottages. Because G&G Fine Arts does not allege direct physical loss of or damage to the described premises, dismissal is warranted on this basis alone.

But even if G&G Fine Arts had alleged direct physical loss of or damage to property at the insured premises, there is no Business Income coverage for the same reason that there is no Civil Authority coverage: a virus is not a Covered Cause of Loss. The virus exclusion expressly applies to Business Income coverage. Kupec Decl., Ex. 1 at 117 ("The exclusion . . . applies to . . . forms or endorsements that cover

business income, extra expense, rental value or action of civil authority.") (emphasis 2 added). If G&G Fine Arts were to amend its Complaint to allege *physical* loss or 3 damage to property at the Cottages, such purported "damage" could only be caused by 4 or result from the Coronavirus.¹⁰ The Policy, however, precludes Business Income 5 coverage claimed on this basis. Thus, as a matter of law, Plaintiff's Complaint 6 premised on the Coronavirus cannot trigger Business Income coverage.¹¹

Plaintiff's claim for Business Income coverage fails as a matter of law for the additional reason that *deferred* rent is not lost business income. See Compl. ¶¶ 15-16 (alleging that the Orders have caused rent "deferral[s]" but not alleging that any rent cannot be collected in the future). The Policy's Civil Authority and Business Income coverages provide compensation only for the "actual loss of Business Income you sustain." Kupec Decl., Ex. 1 at 20. This is an independent basis to dismiss Plaintiff's claims premised on Business Income coverage as a matter of law.¹²

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¹⁰ Although Travelers does not seek adjudication of this issue on this motion, a virus 15 cannot cause direct physical loss or damage as a matter of law because California 16 appellate decisions require "a distinct, demonstrable, physical alteration of the property." MRI Healthcare Ctr. of Glendale, Inc. v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 187 17 Cal. App. 4th 766, 779 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2010); see also Social Life Magazine, Inc. v. Sentinel Ins. Co. Ltd., No. 20 Civ. 3311 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2020) 18 transcript) (available at ECF 24-1) (court explaining in case making allegations 19 similar to Plaintiff's allegations that COVID-19 "damages lungs," "[i]t doesn't damage printing presses" or other property, and "this is just not what's covered 20 under these insurance policies").

²¹ 11 The Complaint also contains passing references to Extra Expense coverage and in one sentence vaguely refers to potential "late fees." Compl. ¶¶ 9, 18. Although 22 these fleeting references are hardly sufficient to plead a claim under the Extra Expense provision, that coverage similarly requires "direct physical loss of or 23 damage to property caused by or resulting from a Covered Cause of Loss" (Kupec 24 Decl., Ex. 1 at 21), and thus there is no coverage for the same reasons that there is no Business Income coverage, as set forth above. The virus exclusion also 25 expressly applies to Extra Expense coverage. Kupec Decl., Ex. 1 at 117.

²⁶ See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Holland Am. Line-Westours, Inc., 25 F. App'x 12 602, 603 (9th Cir. 2002) (lost revenue was reduced by "make-up" reservations that 27 the cruise line was able to process when the system came back online); Admiral Indem. Co. v. Bouley Int'l Holding, LLC, No. 02 CIV. 9696, 2003 WL 22682273, at 28 *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2003).

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C. As a Matter of Law, G&G Fine Arts Is Not Entitled to Any of Its Requested Declarations

Because G&G Fine Arts cannot demonstrate as a matter of law that it is entitled to coverage under the Policy's Civil Authority or Business Income provisions, G&G Fine Arts is not entitled to any of the declarations it seeks. G&G Fine Arts has specifically requested three declarations pertaining to aspects of Civil Authority (or possibly Business Income) coverage under the Policy. Compl., Prayer for Relief. As discussed above, G&G Fine Arts has failed to state a claim that Civil Authority or Business Income coverage exists (the second and third declarations) or that the Orders caused loss or damage to premises (the first declaration). Thus, no cognizable legal theory or set of facts has been alleged to sustain any of the declarations.

12 Indeed, because G&G Fine Arts has failed to allege that it is entitled to a 13 declaration of coverage, the Court can dismiss all other derivative declarations as 14 moot. See Native Vill. of Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1514 (9th Cir. 1994) 15 ("The district court, ... may grant declaratory relief only when there is an actual case 16 or controversy; a declaratory judgment may not be used to secure judicial 17 determination of moot questions."), overruled on other grounds by Bd. of Trustees of 18 Glazing Health & Welfare Tr. v. Chambers, 941 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2019); see also 19 Amaral v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 692 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1236 & n.3 (E.D. Cal. 2010) 20 (dismissing two of three requested declarations in part because "a determination as to 21 whether Plaintiffs [were] entitled to the third requested declaration [would] involve an 22 analysis of the issues surrounding the first two with no need for separate declarations 23 on all three matters").

D. G&G Fine Arts' Claim for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Fails Because G&G Fine Arts Is Not Entitled to Coverage as a Matter of Law

To establish a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, "(1) *benefits due under the policy* must have been withheld; and (2) the reason

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for withholding benefits must have been unreasonable or without probable cause."

2 Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1136, 1151 (1990) (emphasis added). The 3 "threshold requirement" in such a claim is that insurance coverage exists under the 4 plaintiff's policy. Id. at 1152. Thus, a bad faith claim "cannot be maintained unless 5 policy benefits are due under a contract." Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., Inc. 11 Cal. 4th 6 1, 35 (1995); see, e.g., Minich v. Allstate Ins. Co. 193 Cal. App. 4th 477, 493 (2011) (the "claim for tortious breach of contract (bad faith) fails as a matter of law because 7 8 [the insurer] did not breach the Policy"); Brown v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. 215 Cal. App. 9 4th 841, 858 (2013) ("Because the policy did not cover the [insureds'] claims, 10 however, the [insureds] do not have a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.").

12 Applying this well-established California law, district courts routinely dismiss 13 claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when plaintiffs' 14 allegations of coverage under their policies fail to state a claim. See Sigma Fin. Corp. 15 v. Gotham Ins. Co., No. CV1501531AGD, 2017 WL 9511732, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 16 31, 2017) (granting motion to dismiss with prejudice when the insurer "didn't breach 17 the excess-liability insurance contract, so it follows that [the insured] can't possibly 18 recover for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."); O'Keefe v. 19 Allstate Indem. Co., 953 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1116 (S.D. Cal. 2013) ("Because 20 [plaintiffs] cannot sue for bad faith without proving that benefits were withheld under 21 the policy 'as written,' and because [plaintiffs] cannot establish that coverage existed 22 under the express terms of the contract, there is no cause of action for breach of the 23 implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."); Moss v. Infinity Ins. Co., No. 15-24 CV-03456-JSC, 2015 WL 7351395, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2015) (dismissing 25 implied covenant claim when the policy "excluded from coverage the particular 26 situation for which Plaintiff sought benefits."). Here, because G&G Fine Arts is not 27 entitled to coverage under the Policy as a matter of law, its claim for bad faith breach 28 of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be dismissed.

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Dismissal of the Third Cause of Action for Violation of Insurance Code Section 790.03 Is Proper Because There Is No Private Right of Action Under That Section

California's Unfair Insurance Practices Act prohibits "unfair claims settlement practices" by insurers. Cal. Ins. Code, § 790.03(h). More than three decades ago, the California Supreme Court declared that "no private action may be brought under section 790.03" to establish an insurer's liability. *Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos.*, 46 Cal. 3d 287, 313 (1988). Violations are enforceable by the Insurance Commissioner, not individual insureds. *Id.* at 304. Thus, the Court should dismiss the third cause of action because there is no private right of action for unfair claims practices in violation of Section 790.03. *See, e.g., Good v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, No. C 05-05299 SBA, 2006 WL 8443383, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2006) ("because California Insurance Code § 790.03 does not provide a private right of action, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss"); *R. L. H., III by & through Hunter v. United Servs. Auto. Ass 'n*, No. cv-7942-VAP, 2008 WL 11336180, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2008), *aff'd sub nom. R.L.H. ex rel. Hunter v. United Servs. Auto. Ass 'n*, 327 F. App'x 714 (9th Cir. 2009).

V. CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons stated above, G&G Fine Arts has failed to state any claim upon which relief must be granted. Thus, Travelers respectfully requests that the Court dismiss the Complaint with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).¹³

¹³ Travelers notes that some policyholders have petitioned for the creation of an industry-wide COVID-19 business interruption insurance MDL. To the best of Travelers' knowledge, Plaintiff here has not sought to be part of that MDL. Moreover, the hearing on the MDL petition is not scheduled until July 30.

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